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INTRODUCTION 
 
“The securities markets are crucial to our economic performance 
as a nation” because they are vital to the success of American private 
and public sectors.2 Both private companies and government entities 
need capital to operate. One of the primary means of raising capital is 
by issuing securities and selling them to investors.3 While some 
securities are traded nationally on exchanges, such as the New York 
Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), or through the National Association of 
                                                 
1 J.D. candidate, May 2009, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of  
Technology; Bachelor of Science in Information Technology Management, 
summa cum laude, December 2004, Christian Brothers University. 
2 S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 50 (1995); Factbox: What is the municipal bond 
market?, REUTERS, Dec. 30, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/ 
idUSTRE4BT34X20081230 (discussing securities issued in the public sector); 
WORLD BANK, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, DEVELOPING GOVERNMENT 
BOND MARKET: A HANDBOOK 3 (2001).  
3 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, STOCKS, COMMODITIES AND THE MARKET, 
http://usinfo.org/zhtw/DOCS/OutlineEconomy/chap5.html (last visited April 1, 
2009). Consequently, “[i]f the seller's purpose is to raise money for the general use 
of a business enterprise or to finance substantial investments and the buyer is 
interested primarily in the profit the note is expected to generate, the instrument is 
likely to be a ‘security.’” Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 67 (1990). 
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Securities Dealers Automated Quotation system (“Nasdaq”),4 other 
securities are traded within limited groups of investors.  
 Similar to their nationally traded counterparts, non-publicly traded 
securities range from traditional stocks, bonds, and notes, to more 
complex instruments, such as mortgage-backed securities.5 Stocks 
give the purchaser voting rights and the right to dividends contingent 
on the issuer's profits.6 These instruments are freely transferable and 
they typically appreciate over time.7 Bonds and notes, on the other 
hand, do not give investors voting rights or rights to dividends.8 
Rather, they evidence the issuer's promise to repay an extension of 
credit.9 Similar to stocks, these instruments are transferable, but their 
value remains the same over time.10  
 The statutory definition of securities includes a wide range of 
financial instruments either because it mentions them expressly—such 
as stock, bonds, and notes—or under the designation of an “investment 
contract.”11 An “investment contract” is a transaction where “a person 
invests. . .money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits 
solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.”12 Mortgage-
                                                 
4 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, supra note 3. Stocks, Commodities and the Market, 
http://usinfo.org/zhtw/DOCS/OutlineEconomy/chap5.html (last visited April 1, 
2009). 
5 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1). 
6 Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 (1985) (citing United 
Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851 (1975)). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1); Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686. Congress “recognized the 
virtually limitless scope of human ingenuity, especially in the creation of ‘countless 
and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on 
the promise of profits,’ SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946), and 
determined that the best way to achieve its goal of protecting investors was ‘to 
define “the term ‘security’ in sufficiently broad and general terms.”’” Reves v. Ernst 
& Young, 494 U.S. 56, 60–-61 (1990) (citing Forman, 421 U.S. at 847–-848 
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1933))). 
12 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). 
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backed securities are “investment contracts” because investors buy 
them to gain profits from the “efforts of others”—homeowners' efforts 
of paying mortgages—thereby participating in a “common enterprise.”  
 The “common enterprise” involving mortgage-backed securities is 
rather complex. At the core of this enterprise are individual 
homeowners who borrow money from banks, mortgage companies, 
and other mortgage loan originators and offer mortgages as security 
for these loans. Lenders retain security interests in the homes until the 
homeowners pay off the loan.13 But in the meantime, the lenders sell 
these mortgages to governmental or quasi-governmental entities, such 
as the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), the 
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), as well as private 
financial institutions, such as Countrywide Financial, Lehman 
Brothers, and Wells Fargo.14 Governmental and private entities then 
assemble these mortgages into “mortgage pools” and issue securities 
that represent claims on the homeowners' principal and interest 
payments on their respective loans in the pool, thereby creating a 
“common enterprise.”15 
When issuing mortgage-backed securities or other types of 
securities, entities must comply with the Securities Act's obligations of 
disclosure of material information in registration statements, written 
prospectuses, or even oral communications concerning the sale of 
securities.16 To ensure compliance, the Securities Act backs the 
detailed disclosure obligations by a range of sanctions, including a 
private cause of action. Among such private actions sanctions are (1) 
§ 11 of the Securities Act, which imposes liability for material 
misrepresentation or omission in the registration statement;17 (2) 
                                                 
13 See U.S. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, Mortgage-Backed Securities, June 
25, 2007, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa. For a detailed discussion on the Securities Act 
requirements see ALAN R. PALMITER, SECURITIES REGULATION 77-136 (Aspen Law 
& Business 1998). 
17 15 U.S.C. § 77k. 
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§ 12(a)(2), which permit purchasers of securities to seek rescission if 
the offering was carried out “by means of a prospectus or oral 
communication” that is materially false or misleading;18 and, finally 
(3) § 15, which permits civil action against “control persons,” such as 
majority shareholders, directors, or officers of a corporate issuer liable 
under §§ 11 or 12 of the Securities Act.19  
 Plaintiffs can bring a cause of action under the Securities Act in 
federal or state court: both court systems have jurisdiction over claims 
alleging violations of the Securities Act.20 For more than sixty years 
after the enactment of the Securities Act in 1933, plaintiffs were filing 
securities claims in federal court. But, in 1995, Congress imposed 
heighted requirements on class actions alleging violations of the 
Securities Act if such claims were brought in federal court.21 To avoid 
having to comply with the heightened requirements, plaintiffs began 
filing class actions based on the Securities Act in state courts.22  
In 2007, the trend of state court filings of class actions alleging 
violations of the Securities Act culminated into a new type of 
securities litigation: state court filings of class actions alleging 
violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded 
securities in general and mortgage-backed securities in particular.  
The number of lawsuits usually increases when the securities 
market declines.23 The market of mortgage-backed securities proved 
to be no exception. Between 2001 and 2006, the volume of mortgag
backed securities issues exceeded $1 trillion dollars, peaking at more 
than $2 trillion dollars in 2003.
e-
                                                
24 But in 2007 and 2008, the “common 
 
18 Id. at § 77l(a)(2); PALMITER, supra note 16, at 171. 
19 15 U.S.C. § 77o. 
20 Id. at § 77v(a). 
21 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (2005). 
22 69A AM. JUR. 2D Securities Regulation § 887 (2008). 
23 1320 PLI/CORP 265, 267 (2002) (citing Martha Neil, With the Market Fizzle, 
a New Round of Securities Suits Take Aim At once High-Flying IPO's, 88 A.B.A.J. 
49 (2002). 
24 SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS ASSOCIATION, ISSUANCE 
OF AGENCY MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (Dec. 31, 2006), 
http://www.sifma.net/story.asp?id=297. 
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enterprise” of mortgages suffered a setback when the growing number 
homeowners were unable to pay principal or interest on their loans, 
and their homes—securities for the loans—were decreasing in value. 
Thus, seeking to recover losses on their mortgage-backed securities,25 
investors began filing in class actions alleging violations of the 
Securities Act with respect to these non-publicly traded securities, and 
increasingly doing so in state courts.26  
It became important for defendants to remove these claims to 
federal court. A civil action is removable to a district court that has 
subject matter jurisdiction over the case, unless another federal statute 
bars such removal.27 Federal courts have federal question and, in some 
cases, diversity of citizenship jurisdiction over class actions alleging 
violations of the Securities Act.28 But, it is unclear whether another 
federal statute bars removal of class actions alleging violations of the 
Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded securities. Section 
22 of the Securities Act bars removal of claims arising under the 
Securities Act.29 But the removal provision of the Class Action 
Fairness Act (“CAFA”), which Congress enacted in 2005, broadly 
                                                 
25 2008 Activity Is at Its Highest Level Since 2004, NEWS RELEASE, Jan. 6, 
2009, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, 
http://securities.stanford.edu/scac_press/20090106_YIR08_Press_Release.pdf; see 
also Paul Karlsgodt, Troubled Economic Times Can Push the Market for Class 
Actions. But Can You Afford to Take on These Cases? Suemagazine.com, available 
at 
http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2008_YIR/20090106_YIR08_F
ull_Report.pdf. For a discussion on why plaintiffs prefer to litigate in state courts, 
while defendants favor federal courts, see Thomas E. Willging and Shannon R. 
Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in Class Action Litigation: What Difference 
Does it Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 593. 
26 H.R. REP. NO. 105-640, at *10 (1998) 
27 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 
28 The Securities Act expressly grants federal courts jurisdiction over claims 
arising under the Securities Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a). Additionally, a federal court 
may have another basis for exercising jurisdiction under diversity of citizenship. See 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), (d)(2).  
29 The Securities Act provides a narrow exception to such removal bar, but that 
exception does not apply to class actions alleging violations of the Securities Act 
with respect to non-publicly traded securities. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(a), 77p(c). 
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permits removal of class actions.30 Therefore the removal provisions 
of the Securities Act and CAFA conflict. On the one hand, permitting 
removal of a class action alleging violations of the Securities Act with 
respect to non-publicly traded securities conflicts with the Securities 
Act's prohibition on removal of claims arising under the Securities 
Act.31 But, on the other hand, prohibiting removal of such claim 
appears to contradict CAFA, which generally permits removal of class 
actions.32 
 Given the growing number of state court filings of class actions 
alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-nationally 
traded securities in general and mortgage-backed-securities in 
particular,33 it is important to determine whether the Securities Act 
bars removal of these claims. To provide a background for answering 
this question, Part I of this article explains the general framework of 
removal and the conflicting provisions of the Securities Act and the 
Class Action Fairness Act. Next, Part II discusses the Ninth Circuit's 
holding in Luther v. Countrywide that the Securities Act bars removal 
of a class action alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect 
to mortgage-backed securities. Part III analyzes the Seventh Circuit's 
decision in Katz v. Gerardi, in which the court disagreed with Luther 
and held that the Securities Act does not bar removal of class actions 
that allege violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly 
traded securities. Finally, Part IV analyzes and expands on the 
reasoning of the Luther and Katz courts, concluding that the Seventh 
                                                 
30 The CAFA removal provision has some exceptions, none of which apply to 
non-publicly traded securities. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (removal provision); 
28 U.S.C. § 1453(d) (exceptions to the removal provision). 
31 See 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a). 
32 See 28 U.S.C. § 1453. 
33 2008 Activity Is at Its Highest Level Since 2004, NEWS RELEASE, Jan. 6, 
2009, Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, 
http://securities.stanford.edu/scac_press/20090106_YIR08_Press_Release.pdf; see 
also Paul Karlsgodt, Troubled Economic Times Can Push the Market for Class 
Actions. But Can You Afford to Take on These Cases? Suemagazine.com, available 
at http://www.bakerlaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/News/Articles/ 
LITIGATION/Karlsgodt-Sue_Magazine_1-09.pdf. 
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Circuit decided correctly that the Securities Act does not bar removal 
of class actions alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect to 
non-publicly traded securities. 
  
I. BACKGROUND 
 
 To determine whether the Securities Act bars removal of class 
actions alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-
publicly traded securities, it is important to understand the removal 
framework of 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which governs removal of cases from 
state to federal court, provides that “any civil action brought in a State 
court of which the district courts of the Unites States have original 
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant. . .[e]xcept as otherwise 
expressly provided by Act of Congress.”34 Thus, to remove a class 
action alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-
publicly traded securities, defendant must show that (1) the district 
court has jurisdiction over such action; and (2) another statute does not 
bar removal of the claim.35  
 Federal courts have at least one, and, possibly, more, bases for 
jurisdiction over class actions based on the Securities Act. Federal 
question jurisdiction gives federal courts power to hear claims arising 
under the “laws of the United States.”36 The Securities Act is a federal 
law.37 Therefore, federal courts have federal question jurisdiction over 
claims arising under the Securities Act. Additionally, the Securities Act 
expressly gives federal (and state) courts jurisdiction over claims 
arising under that statute.38 Finally, class actions alleging violations of 
the Securities Act may satisfy the diversity-of-citizenship requirements 
                                                 
34 28 U.S.C § 1441. 
35 See id. 
36 Id. at § 1441(b). 
37 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa. 
38 Id. at § 77v(a). 
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of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), thereby providing 
another basis for federal court jurisdiction of such cases.39  
 The issue of whether another federal statute bars removal of class 
actions alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-
publicly traded securities is more complex. To understand why this 
question is complex, it is necessary to examine the removal provisions 
of the Securities Act and the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA.”)  
 
A. The Securities Act  
 
 The Securities Act generally prohibits removal of claims arising 
under the Securities Act, although it does not specifically address class 
actions. Section 22(a) of the Securities Act provides: “[e]xcept as 
provided in section 77p(c) [of title 15], no case arising under. . 
.subchapter [I]40 and brought in any State court of competent 
jurisdiction shall be removed to an court of the United States.”41  
 Section 77p(c)—that § 22(a) references as an exception to the 
Securities Act's prohibition of removal—does not apply to class 
actions arising under the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly 
traded securities.42 Section 77p(c) provides: 
 
Any covered class action43 brought in any State court 
involving a covered security, as set forth in subsection 
                                                 
 39 CAFA expanded federal court jurisdiction over “any civil action in which 
the matter in controversy exceeds. . .$5,000,000, and is a class action in which. . 
.any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any 
defendant.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (d)(2).  
40 Subchapter I of the Securities Act applies to all domestic securities, which 
include non-publicly traded securities at issue in this article. 
41 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (emphasis added). 
42 Id. at § 77p(c). 
43 A “covered class action” is “any single lawsuit” or “any group of lawsuits 
filed in. . .the same court and involving common questions of law or fact” that seeks 
“damages on behalf of more than 50 persons.” 15 U.S.C § 77p(f)(2)(A). 
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(b),44 shall be removable to the Federal district court 
for the district in which the action is pending, and shall 
be subject to subsection (b).45  
 
 For the purposes of § 77p(c), a “covered security” is a security 
“listed. . .on the New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock 
Exchange, or. . .the Nasdaq Stock Market[, or]. . .a national securities 
exchange.”46 Because non-nationally traded securities are not listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, 
Nasdaq, or another national securities exchange, these securities are 
not “covered securities.”47 Thus, the exception under § 77p(c) to the 
Securities Act's removal ban does not apply to class actions alleging 
violations of the Securities Act involving non-nationally traded 
securities.48 But the issue is whether § 22(a) bars removal of these 
claims after the enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act, which 
contains a removal provisions that generally permits removal of class 
actions.  
   
B. The Class Action Fairness Act  
  
 Unlike the removal provision of the Securities Act enacted in 
1933,49 the removal provision of the Class Action Fairness Act 
                                                 
44 BRIAN E. PASTUSZENSKI ET AL., STATE COURT SECURITIES CASES: 
PREEMPTION AND STAYS OF DISCOVERY UNDER THE SECURITIES LITIGATION 
UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT, SJ084 ALI-ABA 825, 840 (2004) (explaining that the 
statutory reference to subsection (b) has caused a number of circuit splits and 
disagreements among federal district courts. The majority of the courts have 
interpreted it to modify “covered class actions.” Therefore, to meet the requirements 
of 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c), a covered class action must satisfy the requirements of 
15 U.S.C. § 77p(b), which, in turn, requirements that the claim be brought under 
state law. See 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b)).  
45 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c). 
46 Id. at § 77r(b). 
47 See id. 
48 Id. at § 77p(c). 
49 See id. at § 77v(a). 
 464
9
Aronchik: A Fair Share (of Removal): Resolving a Conflict Between the Class
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2009
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 4, Issue 2                         Spring 2009 
(“CAFA”) enacted in 2005, addresses removal of class actions.50 
CAFA provides:  
 
[I]n general[,]. . .[a] class action may be removed to a 
district court of the United States in accordance with 
section 1446. . .without regard to whether any 
defendant is a citizen of the State in which the action is 
brought, except that such action may be removed by 
any defendant without the consent of all defendants.51 
 
Section 1446—that the CAFA removal provision references—
requires compliance with certain removal procedures.52 For example, 
to remove a civil action, a defendant must file in the district court a 
notice of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure53 and promptly after doing so, the defendant must give 
written notice of removal to the adverse parties and to the state court.54 
 Although the CAFA removal provision contains exceptions, none 
of them apply to class actions alleging violations of Securities Act 
with respect to non-publicly traded securities.55 Knowledge of these 
exceptions, however, is helpful in interpreting whether the CAFA 
removal provision “trumps”56 the Securities Act's ban on removal. 28 
U.S.C. § 1453(d) provides that the CAFA removal provision: 
 
[S]hall not apply to any class action that solely 
involves (1) a claim concerning a covered security. . .; 
(2) a claim that relates to the internal affairs or 
                                                 
50 See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b). 
51 Id. at § 1453(b); see JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS 
ACTIONS § 12:6 (2008). 
52 28 U.S.C. § 1446. 
53 Id. at § 1446(a). 
54 Id. at § 1446(d).  
55 See id. at § 1453(d). 
56 Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, No. 2:07-CV-08165-
MRP(MANx), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2008). 
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governance of a corporation. . .; or (3) a claim that 
relates to the rights, duties. . ., and obligations relating 
to. . .any security.57  
 
 Class actions alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect 
to non-covered securities do not concern “internal affairs or 
governance of a corporation;” they do not involve rights, duties, or 
obligations relating to a security. Therefore, exceptions under §§ 
1453(d)(2) and (3) do not apply.  
 Although § 1453(d)(1) addresses securities, it indicates the CAFA 
removal provision does not apply to claims involving “covered 
securities;” it is silent with regard to non-publicly traded securities, 
which are not “covered securities.”58 CAFA's silence with respect to 
non-covered securities raises several questions. Therefore, the issue is 
whether the Securities Act bars removal of class actions alleging 
violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded 
securities even though the CAFA removal provision generally permits 
removal of class actions. The Ninth Circuit and the Seventh Circuits 
have answered this question differently. 
 
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT THE SECURITIES ACT BARS 
REMOVAL OF CLASS ACTIONS ALLEGING VIOLATIONS OF THE 
SECURITIES ACT WITH RESPECT TO NON-PUBLICLY TRADED SECURITIES 
 
 To determine whether the Securities Act bars removal of class 
actions alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-
publicly traded securities, it is helpful to consider how courts have 
resolved the conflict between the removal provisions of CAFA and the 
Securities Act. The Ninth Circuit was the first federal appellate court 
to consider this "novel set of removal issues under the securities 
law."59 
 
                                                 
57 28 U.S.C. § 1453(d) (emphasis added).  
58 See id. at § 1453. 
59 Luther, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *4. 
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A. Fact and Procedural History of Luther v. Countrywide 
 
On November 14, 2007, David H. Luther filed a class action 
complaint in Los Angeles County Superior Court against Countrywide 
Home Loans Servicing LP, CWALT, Inc. (“CWALT”), a subsidiary of 
Countrywide Financial Corporation, several other affiliates and 
subsidiaries of Countrywide Financial Corporation, multiple 
alternative loan trusts, and various underwriters.60 At the heart of the 
lawsuit was a type of mortgage-backed securities, pass-through 
certificates,61 which CWALT had issued.62 Between January 2005 and 
January 2007, Luther had acquired, together with other persons and 
entities on behalf of which he was suing, hundreds of billions of 
dollars worth of these securities.63 From the vantage point of 2007, 
plaintiff argued that “the risk of the investments was much greater than 
represented by the registration statements and prospectus supplements 
[for the mortgage-backed securities], which omitted and misstated the 
credit worthiness of the underlying mortgage borrowers.”64 Thus, 
according to Luther, the registration statements and prospectus 
supplements for the mortgage pass-through certificates were false and 
misleading.65 Because “the value of the certificates ha[d] substantially 
declined [after] many of the underlying mortgage loans became 
                                                 
60 Id. at *1. For the definition of an underwriter see 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11). 
 61 Pass-through certificates are a basic type of mortgage-backed security that 
entitles the holder to a pro-rate share of all principal and interest payments made on 
the pool of loan assets. U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, Mortgage-Backed 
Securities, SEC.GOV, June 25, 2007, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm. 
62 Luther, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *1. 
63 Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, 533 F.3d 1031, 1032 (9th 
Cir. 2008). 
64 Id. at 1033. 
65 Id. 
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uncollectible,”66 Luther was seeking damages under §§ 11,67 
12(a)(2),68 and 1569 of the Securities Act.70 
On December 14, 2007, the defendants removed Luther's class 
action federal court pursuant to several statutes: 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), 
the statute governing removal generally, 28 U.S.C. § 1446, a provision 
that sets out removal procedures, and, implicitly, 28 U.S.C. § 1453, the 
CAFA removal provision that requires compliance with the above-
mentioned 28 U.S.C. § 1446.71 Defendants based removal jurisdiction 
on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as amended by CAFA.72 
Luther filed a motion to remand the case back to state court, arguing 
that CAFA did not apply.73  
 
B. Decision of the District Court 
 
On February 28, 2008, the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California granted the plaintiff's motion to remand 
the case to state court.74 The court held that the prohibition on removal 
in the Securities Act “trumps” the general removal provision in 
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)75 for two reasons.76 First, “[n]one of the[] 
concerns” behind the enactment of CAFA resonate in the Securities 
Act cases.77 But the only Congressional concern the court discussed 
                                                 
66 Id. 
67 15 U.S.C. § 77k. 
68 Id. at § 77l(a)(2). 
69 Id. at § 77o. 
70 Luther, 553 F.3d at 1033. 
71 Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, No. 2:07-CV-08165-
MRP(MANx), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2008). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at *1, *11–*12. 
75 28 U.S.C. § 1441 provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by 
Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district 
court[]. . .ha[s]. . .jurisdiction, may be removed.” 
76 Luther, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *1, *8. 
77 Id. at *8. 
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was that of "'mak[ing] it harder for plaintiffs[]. . .to 'game the system' 
by trying to defeat diversity jurisdiction.'"78 Before the adoption of 
CAFA, for a district court to have jurisdiction over a class action, the 
amount in controversy had to be $75,000—which was not an issue in 
most claims—and complete diversity of citizenship among all 
plaintiffs and defendants, which was considerably more difficult to 
achieve in cases involving a multitude of parties.79 The "'gam[ing] [of] 
the system'" or "artful pleading," occurred by adding parties solely 
based on their State of citizenship or alleging an amount in 
controversy that did not trigger the $75,000 threshold.80 Congress was 
concerned with the "artful pleading" that plaintiffs used to manipulate 
the system.81  
By enacting CAFA, Congress sought to remedy "'a technical 
glitch'" in the diversity jurisdiction statute, because of which class 
action cases were usually excluded from federal court.82 With regard 
to this Congressional purpose, the court noted, correctly, "regardless of 
the diversity of the parties or the amount sought, concurrent 
jurisdiction was always present. . .so long as the case was brought 
under the Securities Act."83 Therefore, the court concluded that "the 
apparent motivation[] for the enactment of CAFA [] was largely 
irrelevant. . .in [Securities] Act cases."84 
Next, the court turned to the "basic principle of statutory 
construction that a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific 
subject [was] not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more 
generalized spectrum."85 Under such canon, "[w]here there [was] no 
                                                 
78 Id. at *6 (citing S. Rep. 109-14, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6). 
79 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) with 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). See Luther, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *6–*7 (citing 151 CONG. REC. S1079 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 
2005) (statement of Sen. Dodd)). 
80 Luther, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *6–*7 (citing 151 CONG. REC. 
S1079 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Dodd)). 
81 Id. at *7. 
82 Id. at *7 (quoting 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7). 
83 Id. at *8. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at *9. 
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clear intention otherwise, a specific statute [is] not. . .controlled or 
nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment."86 
In Luther, the defendants "argu[ed] that an affirmative expression o
[Congress's] intent to make [Securities Act claims] removable. . .was 
its failure to create a discrete exception that would preserve non-
removability of [the Securities] Act claims."
f 
                                                
87 Although this argument 
was ultimately "unavailing,"88 it created doubt in the mind of the court 
with respect to removal of the case. 89 But because the court 
"continue[d] to harbor significant doubt that CAFA provide[d] removal 
jurisdiction in the fact of the [Securities] Act's absolute prohibition on 
removal,"90 it remanded the case to state court.91  
Generally, a district court's order remanding a removed case back 
to state court is not appealable. 92 But a permission to appeal can be 
sought and granted in certain cases."93 In Luther, the defendants 
sought,94 and the Ninth Circuit granted, such permission to appeal the 
district court's remand order.95  
 
 
86 Id. (citing Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976)). 
87 Id. (citing Defendants' Opposition to Motion to Remand at 19, Luther, No. 
2:07-CV-08165-MRP(MANx), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534 (C.D. Cal Feb 28, 
2008)). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at *10 (noting that “federal jurisdiction ‘[had to be] rejected if there [was] 
any doubt as to the right of removal.’” (emphasis added)). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at *12. Because the court concluded that CAFA conflicted with the non-
removal provision of the Securities Act, it declined to address the applicability of 
CAFA's exceptions to the complaint at bar. Id. at *10. 
92 Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, 533 F.3d 1031, 1033 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1447(d), 1453(c)(2)). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 1033. 
95 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(2)). 
 470
15
Aronchik: A Fair Share (of Removal): Resolving a Conflict Between the Class
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2009
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 4, Issue 2                         Spring 2009 
C. Decision of the Ninth Circuit 
 
After de novo review, 96 on July 16, 2008, the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the decision of the district court.97 Similar to the lower court, 
the Ninth Circuit briefly addressed the legislative purpose behind the 
adoption of CAFA.98 It noted that Congress enacted CAFA, in part, to 
"'restore the intent of the framers of the United States Constitution by 
providing for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national 
importance under diversity jurisdiction.'"99 But the court did not 
discuss whether its holding that the Securities Act prohibited removal 
of the class at bar advanced such legislative purpose, which it did 
not.100  
The court then turned to the "basic principle of statutory 
construction that a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific 
subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more 
generalized spectrum."101 The court found that the removal provision 
of the Securities Act was "the more specific statute" because it 
"applie[d] to the narrow subject of securities cases."102 CAFA, "on the 
other hand, appli[ed] to a 'generalized spectrum' of class actions." 
Without explaining how the court identified the more specific of the 
two statutes, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the "narrow, precise, and 
specific. . .[Securities Act] [was] not submerged by later enacted 
[CAFA]."103 
Earlier in the decision, the court noted that "[i]n general, removal 
statutes are strictly construed against removal. . .and any doubt is 
                                                 
96 Id.  
97 Id. at 1033–34. 
98 Id. at 1034. 
99 Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 109-2). 
100 Id. at 1033–34.  
101 Id. at 1034 (citing Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co, 426 U.S. 148, 153 
(1976)). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
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resolved against removability."104 But the court did not make clear 
whether it applied this doubt-resolving canon to conclude that "by 
virtue of. . .the Securities Act,. . .Luther's state court class action 
alleging only violations of the Securities Act. . .was not removable."105  
 
III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT THE SECURITIES ACT DOES 
NOT BAR REMOVAL OF CLASS ACTIONS ALLEGING VIOLATIONS OF THE 
SECURITIES ACT WITH RESPECT TO NON-PUBLICLY TRADED SECURITIES 
 
 In Katz v. Gerardi, the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the Luther 
court106 and the district court,107 which had adopted the reasoning of 
Luther. 108 Because the court's holding conflicted with the Ninth 
Circuit's decision in Luther,109 Judge Easterbrook's opinion was 
circulated before release to all judges in active service; none of the 
judges favored a hearing en banc.110  
 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
 
The case began on May 9, 2008, when Jack P. Katz ("Katz") filed 
a class action lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 
alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect non-publicly 
traded securities.111 The nature of the securities at issue is relative 
complex. Originally, Katz and other class members had contributed 
real estate (or interests in real estate) to the Archstone-Smith Operating 
                                                 
104 Id. (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 
(1941); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 1033–34. 
107 Katz v. Gerardi, No. 1:08cv04035, 2008 WL 4376815, at *4–*5 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 23, 2008) (citing Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, No. 2:07-CV-
08165-MRP(MANx), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *6–*7 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 
2008)). 
108 Katz v. Gerardi, 552 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009). 
109 Luther, 533 F.3d at 1033-34. 
110 Katz, 552 F.3d at 562. 
111 Katz, 2008 WL 4376815, at *1. 
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Trust or its predecessor, Charles E. Smith Residential Realty L.P. 112 In 
exchange, they received limited partnership interests in the Archstone-
Smith Operating Trust.113 The general partner in the Archstone-Smith 
Operating Trust was the Archstone-Smith Trust, both a publicly traded 
corporation and a Real Estate Investment Trust ("REIT.")114 
By having a REIT as a general partner, limited partnerships, such 
as the Archstone-Smith Operating Trust, gain the status of an Umbrella 
Real Estate Investment Trust ("UPREIT").115 Archstone REIT, like the 
Archstone UPREIT, "engaged primarily in the acquisition, 
development, redevelopment, operations and long-term ownership of 
apartment communities in the United States."116 Together, they 
"owned or had an ownership position in 348 communities, 
representing 88,01 1171 [apartments]."  
                                                
 By contributing real estate to the Archstone UPREIT as opposed 
to the Archstone REIT, plaintiffs not only received limited partnership 
interests in the entity, but also gained significant tax and liquidity 
advantages.118 Contributions of property to a REIT are taxable in the 
amount equal to the excess of the value of the stock received over the 
basis of the property contributed.119 By contributing real estate to the 
Archstone UPREIT, plaintiffs received tax-deferred treatment of the 
transactions, avoiding tax liability.120 They also enjoyed liquidity of 
their limited partnership interests. Although A-1 Units were not traded 
publicly, plaintiffs could convert them into the common stock of 
 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Complaint ¶ 45, Katz v. Gerardi, No. 08CH17172 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook 
County May 9, 2008). 
115 Id. at ¶ 40. 
116 Id. at ¶ 46. 
117 Id. at ¶ 46. 
118 Id. at ¶ 49. 
119 Id. at ¶¶ 21, 39. 
120 Id. at ¶ 7. 
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Archstone REIT, which was publicly traded on the New York Stock 
exchange.121  
Katz argued that the holders of A-1 Units lost both tax and 
liquidity advantages because of a subsequent merger between the 
Archstone UPRET and the Archstone REIT with the Tishman-Lehman 
Partnership, a partnership sponsored by Tishman Speyer and Lehman 
Brothers Holdings.122 The merger led to the registration and issuance 
of new securities, Series O Preferred Units.123 Holders of the old 
securities could exchange their A-1 Units for Series O Preferred Units 
or sell them for cash.124 Katz chose the latter option. 125 But he argued 
that by accepting the cash offer, he lost the tax benefits he had 
expected when contributing real estate to the Archstone UPREIT and, 
together with other A-1 Unit holders, incurred capital gains that had 
"resulted in millions of dollars of tax" liability.126 Further, Katz argued 
that if the holders had converted their A-1 units into Series O Preferred 
Units, they would have forfeited their liquidity advantages because 
Series O units were not going to be publicly traded for at least five 
years after the merger.127 
Thus, Katz filed a class action lawsuit against the Archstone 
UPREIT, Archstone REIT, the directors and trustees of Archstone 
REIT, as well as Tishman Speyer and Lehman Brothers Holdings 
alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect to the Series O 
Preferred Units, which were, at least initially, non-publicly traded 
securities. According to the plaintiff, "the Prospectus and Registration 
statement issued pursuant to the merger agreement contained false and 
                                                 
121 Id. at ¶ 47. 
122 Id. at ¶¶ 8, 9, 59, 75. 
123 Katz v. Gerardi, 552 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009). 
124 Complaint ¶¶ 7, 8, 67, Katz v. Gerardi, No. 08CH17172 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook 
County May 9, 2008). 
125 Id. at ¶ 7. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at ¶ 8. 
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misleading information about the merger."128 Additionally, the 
transactions "resulting in the A-1 unit holders exchanging their A-1 
units for cash and/or new securities were solicited through false and 
misleading prospectuses and the securities were issued by way of a 
materially false and misleading registration statement."129 Thus, 
plaintiff based his claims on §§ 11,130 12(a)(2),131 and 15132 of the 
Securities.133 
 On July 16, 2008, defendant removed Katz's class action to 
federal court, the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois.134 A few days later, on July 23, 2008, Katz filed a motion to 
remand the case to state court.135 
 
B. Decision of the District Court 
 
On September 23, 2008, the United States District Court granted 
the motion to remand the case to state court.136 First, the court 
considered whether the Securities Act applied to the case at bar.137 The 
defendants argued it did not because even though Katz "ha[d] cast his 
claims as arising under the [Securities] Act, he [did] not have a viable 
claim under the [statute.]"138 To maintain a claim under the Securities 
                                                 
128 Katz v. Gerardi, No. 1:08cv04035, 2008 WL 4376815, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 23, 2008). 
129 Complaint ¶ 10, Katz v. Gerardi, No. 08CH17172 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook 
County May 9, 2008). 
130 15 U.S.C. § 77k. 
131 Id. at § 77l(a)(2). 
132 Id. at § 77o. 
133 Complaint ¶ 11, Katz v. Gerardi, No. 08CH17172 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook 
County May 9, 2008). 
134 Notice of Removal, Katz v. Gerardi, No. 1:08cv04035, 2008 WL 4376815 
(July 16, 2008). 
135 Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, Katz v. Gerardi, No. 1:08cv04035, 
2008 WL 4376815 (July 23, 2008). 
136 Katz, 2008 WL 4376815, at *5. 
137 Id. at *3–*4. 
138 Id. at *3 n.3. 
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Act, "[a person] must be a purchaser or acquiror of securities."139 
Because Katz received cash for his A-1 units, defendants argued, he 
"neither 'acquired' nor 'purchased a 'security' as required in those 
provisions.140 Katz disagreed, arguing that he was a purchaser of 
securities because "his A-1 shares were effectively changed by the 
merger into A-1 Units with inferior economic rights."141 Although the 
court “[did] not. . .find Katz's argument factually persuasive," it 
concluded that the "the state court [was] the proper forum for the 
alleged claims to be determined. . .even if. . .Katz alleged. . .claims 
under the [Securities] Act to avoid removal under [the Securities 
Act].”142  
The court's conclusion that the state court was the proper forum 
for the securities class action at bar was based on Luther.143 The court 
found persuasive the Ninth Circuit's reliance on the canon of statutory 
construction favoring specific statutes over general statutes.144 Thus, 
like the Luther court, the district court concluded that “Section 22(a), 
the more specific statute governing securities actions, control[led] this 
situation, not the CAFA, which generally governs large class 
actions.”145 Accordingly, the court remanded the class action to state 
court.146 
On October 6, 2008, the defendants filed a petition for permission 
to appeal pursuant to CAFA,147 and the Seventh Circuit granted their 
petition.148 
                                                 
139 Id. at *3. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at *4. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at *5. 
147 Petition for Permission to Appeal, Katz v. Gerardi, 552 F.3d 558 (Oct. 6, 
2008). CAFA provides for discretionary appellate review of district court orders 
granting or denying motions for remand. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1)  
148 Katz v. Gerardi, 552 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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C. Seventh Circuit's Decision 
 
On January 5, 2009, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district 
court's order to remand Katz's class action.149 The Seventh Circuit 
disagreed with the district court's conclusion that plaintiff can 
foreclose removal simply by invoking the Securities Act.150 Writing 
for the panel, Judge Easterbrook noted that "it cannot be right to say 
that a pleader's choice of language always defeats removal."151 As 
defendants pointed out, “ [o]nly purchasers of securities may pursue 
[private] actions under the [Securities] Act.”152 Because “Katz (and 
other members of his class) sold securities for cash. . .he did not buy 
any new security.”153 Thus, Katz did not necessarily have a private 
right of action under the Securities Act.154 But the Seventh Circuit 
then concluded “it [was] possible for a private party to suffer an injury 
covered by the securities laws even though there is no private right of 
action.”155  
Because “it was best to assume that Katz's complaint [was] not 
just artful pleading,” the court considered whether the Securities Act 
“insulated” all claims under the Securities Act from removal under 
CAFA.156 The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that CAFA and the 
Securities Act were “incompatible; one or the other had to yield.”157 
To determine which of the statutes had to yield, the court turned to the 
                                                 
149 Id. at 563. 
150 Id. at 560. The court was responding to the district court's statement that 
“the state court [was] the proper forum for the alleged claims to be determined. . 
.even if. . .Katz alleged. . .claims under the [Securities] Act to avoid removal under 
[the Securities Act].” Katz, 2008 WL 4376815, at *4. 
151 Katz, 552 F.3d at 560. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 See id. at 561. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
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canons of statutory construction.158 Among such canons is the 
principle that “the older law yields to the newer.”159 But “Luther [held] 
that things are otherwise for [the Securities Act] because. . .an older 
law maintains its vitality when it is more specific than a newer 
one.
e 
 the 
l 
l 
 
ore specific because it dealt 
moval rule applied to securities actions. Section § 1453(b) provides:  
 
the action is brought, except that such action may be 
                                                
”160  
The Seventh Circuit disagreed, noting that “canon favoring 
preservation of specific statutes arguably affected by newer, mor
general statutes works [only] when one statute is a subset of the 
other.”161 But—as Luther “failed to recognize”—the Securities Act 
was not a subset of CAFA.162 Therefore, the court could not apply
canon favoring the specific law over general because it could not 
determine whether the Securities Act is more specific or more genera
than CAFA.163 The removal provision of the Securities Act “covers 
only securities actions, but it includes. . .single-investor suits as wel
as class actions[;]. . .[CAFA], by contrast, covers only large, multi-
state class actions." Therefore, there [was] no answer to. . .a question
[of whether] the [Securities] Act was more specific because it dealt 
only with securities law, or CAFA was m
only nationwide class actions.”164  
 Even though the canon did not aid the court's statutory 
interpretation, the language of CAFA “told” the court how the new 
re
[I]n general[,]. . .[a] class action may be removed to a 
district court of the United States. . .without regard to 
whether any defendant is a citizen of the State in which 
 
158 Id. (emphasis added). 
159 Id. (emphasis added). 
160 Id. (emphasis added). 
161 Id. at 561–62. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Katz, 552 F.3d at 561-62.Id. 
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removed by any defendant without the consent of all 
defendants.165 
 
Thus, the court concluded that § 1453(b) “allows removal of any class 
action brought within federal jurisdiction.”166 Next, the court analyzed 
§ 1453(d), which contains the list of exceptions to applicability of the 
CAFA removal provision: 
 
This section shall not apply to any class action that 
solely involves (1) a claim concerning a covered 
security. . .; (2) a claim that relates to the internal 
affairs or governance of a corporation. . .; or (3) a 
claim that relates to the rights, duties. . ., and 
obligations relating to. . .any security.167 
 
 According to the Seventh Circuit, “claims listed in this list are not 
removable. Other securities class actions are removable if they meet 
CAFA requirements.”168 To read § 22(a) as barring removal of a class 
action not involving a claim listed in § 1453(d), as plaintiff suggests, 
“would be to make most of § 1453(d) pointless.”169 Because § 1453(d) 
“left no doubt about how the [Securities] Act. . .and CAFA fit 
together,” the court found no reason to use doubt-resolving canons of 
statutory construction.170 
 Although the Seventh Circuit had “no doubt” that the Securities 
Act did not bar removal of class actions alleging violations of the 
Securities with respect to non-covered securities, the court noted that 
“there was some incongruity in removing a securities action under 
                                                 
165 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b); JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS 
ACTIONS § 12:6 (2008). 
166 Katz, 552 F.3d at 562 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b)). 
167 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b)).  
168 Id. 
169Id. 
170 Id. 
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[CAFA].”171 The “incongruity” arose from the fact CAFA created a 
“species of diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction,” but it permitted 
removal of claims—such as class actions alleging violations of the 
Securities Act—over which federal courts have federal question 
jurisdiction.172 Despite such “incongruity,” the court concluded, “both 
the principal [CAFA] removal rule and [its] exceptions show[ed] that 
[CAFA] applies to claims that arise under federal law (provided that 
minimal diversity is present).”173 
Finally, the court considered whether § 1453(d) exceptions 
prevented removal of Katz's class action.174 First, the court concluded 
that the A-1 Unites in Archstone were not “covered securities” because 
they did not trade nationally; therefore, § 1453(d)(1) exception did not 
apply.175 Second, Katz did not characterize his claim as dealing with 
corporate internal affairs; therefore, § 1453(d)(2) did not apply.176 
Finally, § 1453(d)(3) exempts from operation of CAFA claims relating 
“to the rights, duties. . ., and obligations relating to. . .any security.”177 
The parties disagreed as to whether § 1453(d)(3) applied, and the court 
remanded the case to the district court for a hearing at which the 
parties could “elaborate on their positions.”178 The Seventh Circuit 
noted that unless § 1453(d)(3) prevented removal under CAFA, the 
defendants removal of Katz's class action alleging violations of the 
Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded securities was 
proper under CAFA, and the district court had to decide the case on its 
merits.179 
 
                                                 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 562–63. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id.  
178 Id. at 563. 
179 Id. 
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IV. SEVENTH CIRCUIT RESOLVES CORRECTLY THE CONFLICT BETWEEN 
REMOVAL PROVISION OF CAFA AND THE SECURITIES ACT 
 
 In Katz v. Gerardi,180 the Seventh Circuit decided correctly that 
the Securities Act does not bar removal of class actions alleging 
violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded 
securities. The United States Supreme Court has held repeatedly that 
“[t]he starting point for interpretation of a statute ‘is the language of 
the statute itself.’”181 Thus, the Seventh Circuit was correct to both 
analyze the language of the CAFA removal provision and to criticize 
Luther for failing to “analyze this language or even acknowledge its 
existence.”182  
 But, when interpreting the statute, the duty of the court is to “find 
[an] interpretation [that] can most fairly be said to be imbedded in the 
statute, in the sense of being most harmonious with its scheme and 
with the general purposes that Congress manifested.”183 Accordingly, 
courts consider the legislative history of the statute to clarify or 
confirm understanding of the statutory language.184 When determining 
whether the Securities Act bars removal of class actions alleging 
violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded 
                                                 
180 Id. 
181 Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835 
(1990) (quoting Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 
U.S. 102, 108 (1980)). 
182 Katz, 552 F.3d at 562. 
183 C.I.R. v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 217 (1984) (citing NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 
352 U.S. 282, 297 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(emphasis added)). 
184 See e.g., Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 386 (1948) (noting 
that “words generally have different shades of meaning, and are to be construed if 
reasonably possible to effectuate intent of lawmakers and meaning in particular 
instances is to be arrived at not only by consideration of words themselves but by 
considering context [and] purposes of law”); United States v. Choice, 201 F.3d 837, 
841 (6th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the plain language of the statute is the starting 
point for statutory interpretation, but that the structure and language of the statute as 
a whole can aid in interpreting the plain meaning and that legislative history can be 
looked to if the statutory language is unclear). 
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securities, neither Katz nor Luther considered adequately the 
legislative history of CAFA and the Securities Act. The Seventh 
Circuit was silent on CAFA's legislative purpose. The district court 
and the Ninth Circuit in Luther appeared to recognize the importance 
of legislative history.185 But their analysis of Congress's purposes for 
the enactment of CAFA was incomplete: the courts discussed only the 
reasons for expansion of federal court jurisdiction over class actions, 
not the purposes behind the CAFA removal provision.186  
 An in-depth look at the legislative purpose behind the enactment 
of the CAFA removal provision reveals that it is best served by 
holding—as the Seventh Circuit did in Katz v. Gerardi187—that the 
Securities Act does not bar removal of class actions alleging violations 
of the Securities Act with respect to non-nationally traded securities. 
Luther's approach of applying the Securities Act's removal bar to such 
claims, on the other hand, impedes Congress's goals. Additionally, 
nothing in the legislative history of the Securities Act evidences a 
Congressional intent to prohibit removal of class actions alleging 
violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded 
securities. Therefore, the appropriate way to resolve the conflict 
between the removal provisions of CAFA and the Securities Act is to 
hold that the Securities Act does not bar removal of class actions 
alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-nationally 
traded securities; thus, such claims are removable if they otherwise 
meet CAFA removal requirements. 
 
A. Legislative History of CAFA 
 
CAFA's legislative history supports the conclusion that the 
Securities Act does not bar removal of class actions alleging violations 
of the Securities Act with respect to non-nationally traded securities. 
                                                 
185 Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th 
Cir. 2008); Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, No. 2:07-CV-08165-
MRP(MANx), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *7–*8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2008). 
186 Luther, 533 F.3d at 1034; Luther, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *7–*8. 
187 Katz, 552 F.3d at 563. 
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In Luther, the district court indicated that Congress enacted CAFA, in 
part, to “make it harder for plaintiffs to. . .defeat diversity jurisdiction” 
in class actions.188 But as the court correctly noted, even before the 
enactment of CAFA, federal courts had jurisdiction over cases arising 
under the Securities Act.189 Because the Securities Act is a federal 
statute, claims arising under the Securities Act fall within federal 
question jurisdiction of the district courts.190 Therefore, CAFA's 
expansion of federal court diversity jurisdiction over class actions is 
“irrelevant” to securities class actions.191  
 But when enacting the CAFA removal provision, Congress sought 
to only expand federal courts' jurisdiction over class actions, but also 
to ensure that class actions were litigated in federal court. Congress 
articulated three reasons why federal courts, not state courts, should 
hear these cases: (1) federal courts help protect federal interest in 
interstate commerce; (2) federal courts ensure compliance with 
appropriate litigation procedures; and (3) federal courts help avoid 
duplicative litigation.192 These legislative goals apply to class actions 
alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly 
traded securities. Therefore, they are best served by holding that the 
Securities Act does not bar removal of class actions alleging violations 
of the Securities Act. On the other hand, if courts interpret the 
Securities Act as barring removal of class actions involving securities, 
these claims, unlike other class actions, cannot be litigated in federal 
court, thereby impeding Congress's goals.  
 
1. Protecting Federal Interest in Interstate Commerce 
 
The Unites States Supreme Court has recognized that federal 
court is the appropriate forum for cases that have ramifications for 
                                                 
188 Luther, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *6. 
189 Id. at *8. 
190 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). 
191 Luther, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26534, at *8. 
192 Julia B. Strickland et al., 2007 Overview of the Class Action Fairness Act, 
761 PLI/Lit 11, at *15–*16 (2007). 
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interstate commerce: the Court has “frequently had occasion to show. . . 
the existence of federal supervision over interstate commerce, and the 
consequent obligation upon the federal courts to protect that right of 
control from encroachment on the part of the states.”193 Congress 
believed that class actions have “significant implications for the 
national economy.”194 As the Ninth Circuit noted—but seemed to 
ignore when remanding Luther's claim to state court—Congress 
enacted CAFA, in part, to “‘restore the intent of the framers of the 
United States Constitution by providing for Federal court 
consideration of interstate cases of national importance under 
diversity jurisdiction.’”195 Congress understood that class actions 
“usually involve large amounts of money and many plaintiffs.” 196 
Further, there is a “growing trend. . .to bring huge class actions on 
behalf of hundreds of thousands or even millions of [plaintiffs].”197 
Therefore, Congress concluded that “the federal courts are the 
appropriate forums to decide most interstate class actions.”198  
 These concerns resonate with class actions alleging violations of 
the Securities Act with respect to non-nationally traded securities. 
First, these cases have significant ramifications for interstate 
commerce. The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
“private securities litigation [is] an indispensable tool with which 
defrauded investors can recover their losses.”199 Recent state court 
filings of class actions alleging violations of the Securities Act with 
respect to non-publicly traded securities “involve large amounts of 
money and many plaintiffs.” Katz v. Gerardi involved “hundreds, if 
                                                 
193 New York, L E & W R Co v. Com. of Pennsylvania, 158 U.S. 431, 437 
(1895). 
194 S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 11 (2005). 
195 Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (citing Pub. L. No. 109-2). 
196 S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 27(2005). 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006). 
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not thousands of similarly situated A-1 Unit holders”200 seeking, at 
minimum, “rescissory damages for their exchange[s]” of A-1 Units for 
$60.75 each.201 In Suffolk v. Plumbers' Union Local No. 12 Pension 
Fund, a class action filed in state court and alleging violations of the 
Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded securities, “plaintiff 
believe[d] that there [were] thousands members in the proposed 
Class,”202 all seeking rescissory damages.203 Thus, class actions 
alleging violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly 
have significant ramifications for interstate commerce and, therefore,  
fall within the category of cases that Congress intended for federal, not 
state courts, to hear. Therefore, the Congress's goal of protecting the 
federal interest in interstate commerce is best served by holding that 
the Securities Act does not bar removal of class action alleging 
violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded 
securities.  
 
2. Ensuring Compliance with Proper Litigation Procedures 
 
 Another reason for the enactment of the CAFA removal provision 
was to “minimize the class action abuses taking place in state 
courts.”204 More specifically, Congress noted that federal court judges 
“were [more] careful than [some of] their state court counterparts 
about applying the procedural requirements that govern class 
actions.”205 Thus, Congress enacted CAFA to remedy state courts' 
                                                 
200 Complaint ¶ 89, Katz v. Gerardi, No. 08CH17172 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook 
County, Ill. May 9, 2008). 
201 Complaint ¶ 113, Katz, No. 08CH17172 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook County May 9, 
2008). 
202 Complaint ¶ 26, Suffolk v. Plumbers' Union Local No. 12, No. 08-0544-
BLS (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 2008). 
203 Complaint at ¶¶ 27–28, Suffolk v. Plumbers' Union Local No. 12, No. 08-
0544-BLS (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 2008). 
204 S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 27 (2005). 
205 Id. at 14. 
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“often inadequate supervision over [class action] litigation 
procedures.”206 
 There are two levels of concern with respect to litigation 
procedures for class actions alleging violations of the Securities Act 
with respect to non-publicly traded securities First, because of the 
large number of parties, which, oftentimes are citizens of different 
states, state courts understandably may have difficulty ensuring 
“inadequate supervision over litigation procedures” in these cases.207  
 The second concern with respect to litigation procedures in 
securities class actions is that state courts do not have power to enforce 
heightened procedural requirements that Congress enacted in 1995 
specifically for securities class actions.208 That year, Congress found 
that plaintiffs had been abusing the Securities Act to bring meritless 
claims “to harass and cajole settlements out of businesses that had 
done nothing wrong.”209 Therefore, existing litigation procedures—
even if adequately supervised—were insufficient to thwart plaintiffs' 
abuse of securities class actions. 210 
 To remedy the problem, Congress enacted the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), creating new procedures for 
“private action arising under [the Securities Act] brought as a plaintiff 
class action pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”211 The 
PSLRA imposed heightened procedural requirements for many aspects 
of securities class action litigation, including certification of a class 
representative,212 appointment of lead plaintiff,213 notices to plaintiffs, 
                                                 
206 S. REP. NO. 109-14,Id. at 4 (2005). 
207 Complaint ¶¶ 12–33, Katz v. Gerardi, No. 08CH17172 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook 
County May 9, 2008). 
208 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1. 
209 STATE COURT SECURITIES CASES: PREEMPTION AND STAYS OF DISCOVERY 
UNDER THE SECURITIES LITIGATION UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT 830 (Am. Law Inst. 
2004). 
210 Id. 
211 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (emphasis added); see 14 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, 
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 6831.50 (2008). 
212 15 U.S.C § 77z-1(a)(2). 
213 Id. at § 77z-1(a)(3). 
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recovery by plaintiffs,214 discovery rules,215 sanctions for abusive 
litigation,216 and defendant's right to written interrogatories.217 To 
prevent abuses of the securities class action scheme, Congress raised 
the standard for adequacy threshold for class representatives in 
securities fraud class litigation and required certification by each 
named plaintiff of knowledge of and accuracy of the complaint.218 
Further, the PSLRA dictated that “all discovery. . .be stayed during the 
pendency of any motion to dismiss.”219 It also required that notice to 
class members of a proposed settlement specify the average amount of 
damages per share and the attorney fee award sought, and in some 
cases, even limited plaintiff's recovery to his or her pro rate share.220 
Because the PSLRA applies only to claims filed “pursuant to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,”221 state courts do not have power to 
enforce these requirements. But if class actions alleging violations of 
the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded securities are 
removable to federal court, class action plaintiffs would have to 
comply with these heightened standards. Therefore, by holding that 
the Securities Act does not bar removal of class action alleging 
violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded 
securities—the Seventh Circuit's holding in Katz222—would further 
Congress's goal of preventing abusive securities class actions. 
Additionally, it would further Congress's purpose behind the 
enactment of CAFA: inadequate supervision of other litigation 
procedures with respect to class actions. On the other hand, a holding 
                                                 
214 Id. at § 77z-1(a)(4). 
215 Id. at § 77z-1(b). 
216 Id. at § 77z-1(c). 
217 Id. at § 77z-1(d). 
218 Id. at § 77z-1(a)(2). 
219 Id. at § 77z-1(b)(1). 
220 14 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 6866.10 (2008). 
221 15 U.S.C § 77z-1. 
222 Katz v. Gerardi, 552 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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to the contrary—like the Ninth Circuit's holding in Luther223—would 
impede both Congressional goals. 
 
3. Avoiding Duplicate Claims 
 
 Finally, by enacting the CAFA removal provision, Congress 
sought to prevent plaintiffs from filing duplicative claims. These 
filings of “expensive and predatory copy-cat cases” were possible 
because state courts do not have a mechanism to consolidate these 
cases.224 Therefore, plaintiffs could “force defendants to litigate the 
same case in multiple jurisdictions, driving up consumer costs.”225 But 
2005—the time of the enactment of CAFA—was not the first time 
Congress expressed concern with the filing of parallel claims. 
 Seven years earlier, Congress acknowledged that the filing of 
parallel securities class actions became an issue in private securities 
litigation after the enactment of the PSLRA.226 The PSLRA, among 
other things, imposed a discovery stay during pending motions to 
dismiss.227 To avoid such a federal discovery stay, plaintiffs pursued 
initial stages of litigation in state courts.228 In 1998, Congress 
attempted to curb the filing of parallel class actions claims alleging 
                                                 
223 Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th 
Cir. 2008). 
224 S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 15 (2005). 
225 Id. 
226 Gareth T. Evans, The 1998 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act 
(SLUSA) and Discovery in Parallel State Court Actions, PLI § 4:6.1 (2006); H.R. 
REP. NO. 105-640, at *10–*11 (1998). 
227 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(b). 
228 Ten Things We Know & Ten Things We Don't Know About the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on 
Securities of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (1997) (joint 
written testimony of Joseph A. Grundfest and Michael A. Perino). Although there 
could be unrelated reasons for plaintiffs to seek state courts, commentators have 
largely discounted those. A Census of Securities Class Action Litigation After the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. 
on Securities of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (1997) 
(written testimony of Michael A. Perino). 
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violations of the Securities Act by enacting the Securities Litigation 
Uniform Standards Act (“SLUSA”), an exception to the Securities 
Act's removal ban for claims arising under the Securities Act. But 
because of the narrow scope of the SLUSA exception—which some 
commentators have suggested was a “drafting blunder”229—plaintiff 
continued filing parallel claims. In Katz, for example, plaintiffs filed 
claims in both the Circuit Court of Cook County, an Illinois state 
court, and the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, 
a federal court.230 In fact, in Katz, plaintiff “candidly admit[ted]. . 
.that. . .a nearly-identical [suit]. . .filed on behalf of the same putative 
plaintiff class against the same defendants and based on the same 
facts. . .ha[d] been pending for months. . .[in the] District of 
Colorado.”231  
 The fact that Congress voiced concern over duplicative filing of 
class actions again in 2005 demonstrates that it remained unsatisfied 
with SLUSA's failure to remedy the problem with respect to securities 
class actions. To advance Congress's goal courts should hold that the 
Securities Act does not bar removal of class action alleging violations 
of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded securities. A 
holding to the contrary would inhibit the goal that Congress has 
repeatedly stated it wanted to achieve. Accordingly, not only the 
language, but also the legislative history of CAFA supports the 
Seventh Circuit's conclusion that the Securities Act does not bar 
removal of class actions alleging violations of the Securities Act with 
respect to non-publicly traded securities. 
 
B. The Securities Act Did Not Contemplate Class Actions  
 
 Holding that the Securities act does not bar removal of class 
actions alleging violations of the Securities Act is not inconsistent with 
                                                 
229 Harold S. Bloomenthal, Securities Litigation – Up Close and Personal (pt. 
2), 31 No. 2 Securities and Federal Corporate Law Report 1 (2009). 
230 Stender v. Gerardi, No. 1:07-cv-02503-EWN-MJW (D. Colo. filed Dec. 30, 
2007). 
231 Reply in Support of Motion to Transfer at 1, Katz v. Gerardi, No. 
08CH17172 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill. Aug. 6, 2008). 
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the Securities Act. Congress enacted the Securities Act's removal ban 
in 1933, at the time when the class actions did not yet exist. The 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure rule governing federal court class 
actions232 was adopted in 1938.233 But, even after the adoption of that 
rule, class action lawsuits were serving primarily as tools for civil 
rights litigants seeking injunctions in discrimination cases.234 
Although in the 1980s, class actions expanded to mass torts,235 the 
concept of securities class actions "that are a familiar part of tod
legal landscape [of securities law] did not arise until 1996.
ay's 
d 
hibit 
                                                
236 At that 
time, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was "substantially amende
to expand the availability of the device."237 Thus, as the history of 
class actions indicates, Congress could not have intended to pro
removal of securities class actions when enacting the removal 
provision of the Securities Act. Accordingly, holding that the 
Securities Act does not bar removal of class actions alleging violations 
of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded securities is 
not inconsistent with the Securities Act.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In Katz v. Gerardi, the Seventh Circuit correctly concluded that 
the Securities Act does not bar removal of class actions alleging 
violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded 
securities.238 Therefore, defendants can remove class actions alleging 
violations of the Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded 
securities on the basis of the general removal provision, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1441, and the CAFA removal provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b). 
 
232 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
233 See also S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 6 (2005). 
234 Id. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. 
238 Katz v. Gerardi, 552 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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Further, for a removal under CAFA to be proper, defendants must 
comply with the removal procedures of 28 U.S.C. § 1446.239  
Permitting removal of class actions alleging violations of the 
Securities Act with respect to non-publicly traded securities, such as 
mortgage-backed securities, is consistent with the language and the 
legislative history of the Class Action Fairness Act. Further, providing 
a federal forum for these claims advances important public policy 
goals. It strikes the appropriate balance between ensuring that (1) 
“defrauded investors [can] recover their losses” from purchases of 
non-publicly traded securities where issuers violated the Securities 
Act; (2) both plaintiffs and defendants follow appropriate litigation 
procedures; (3) defendants do not suffer an unfair burden by having to 
defend duplicative litigation in several courts; and (4) the federal 
interest in interstate commerce is protected by having the federal court 
hear these claims. In sum, holding that the Securities Act does not bar 
removal of class actions alleging violations of the Securities Act with 
respect to non-publicly traded securities helps create a “fair [non-
publicly traded] share.” 
 
 
                                                 
239 See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b). 
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